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education and on-the-job experience are essential determinants on wage estimations. This 
assessment is not disputed in the literature however; there are still differences on wages that are 
not explained by the traditional variables suggested in the theory. These differences are usually 
attributed to active discrimination against women. This study suggests that discrimination is not 
just one reason behind the gap but instead, it is the most relevant reason since women have 
achieved equal or even higher productive characteristics as men and their ability on obtaining 
financial compensation for their work is being severely affected. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the twentieth century, women’s participation in the labor market systematically 
increased, especially in the Western world. However, the conditions women are brought into 
the labor market are not always ideal. In most contexts, women take on family 
responsibilities and housework to a far great extent than men, which reflects an unequal 
division of labor within the family (Hartmann 1981, Blau & Kahn 2007, Hersch & Stratton 
1994, Lundberg 2008). 
Adding to the unequal division of labor, women have, throughout history, received lower 
wages when compared to men, being that an undisputed issue (Waldfogel 1998, England 
1982, Polachek 1975, Korenman & Neumark 1992, Goldin 2006). 
What is disputed, however, is the interpretation of this fact alongside its causes. That 
controversy is divided into two different branches of ideas being one relying on the market 
forces and the other one relying on the idea of customary wages. 
The first branch argues that differences in wages reflects differences in productivity. The 
idea is heavily based on the classical economic theory suggesting that employers will 
maximize profits and, in order to do so, the wage paid to an employee must be his/her 
marginal product of labor. Any other output different than that would imply in non-
maximization of profits, thus, irrational behavior from the firm. Adding to productivity context, 
Becker (1985 p.33) suggests that “(…)since child care and housework are more effort 
intensive than leisure and other household activities, married women spend less effort on 
each hour of market work than married men working the same number of hours”. The effects, 
however, spreads way beyond the productivity itself also affecting career choices the 
“responsibility of married women for child care and housework has major implications for 
earnings and occupational differences between men and women.” (Becker 1985 p.56). 
Therefore, that branch could explain the wage-gap through productivity and occupational 
choice. 
The second branch, however, is more skeptical about the efficiency of market forces and 
argue that wages are of customary nature and may be the result of an ideology that 
devaluate women’s role in society. Arguably, women’s wages would be determined in a 
customary way and not by market forces (Sharpe 1996). Other authors claim, “(women) 
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earned a customary wage not one which was generated out of open competition in a 
sexually neutral labor market” (Rose 1988, p 207).  
A number of studies have addressed the wage gap in Brazil, many focusing on the 
discrimination and customary wage setting. Analyses of the 1980s and 1990s indicate that 
productive characteristics are not the full explanation for the Brazilian wage gap since 
women by each decade have become more similar to men with respect to productivity-
related characteristics. For example, women have attained equal, or even higher, education 
compared to men. However, despite more similarity in level of education, the returns to 
education and experience are still better for men. Consequently, a large part of the gender 
difference in earnings is unexplained and some argue that it is attributed to active 
discrimination against women (Barros et al 1995; Leme & Wajnman 2000, Wajnman 2013, 
Madalozzo, 2010, Kassouf 1998, Giuberti & Menezes-Filho 2005). 
Considering this scenario, this paper aims to study the wage gap in Brazil between 2003 
and 2013. It aims to investigate the size of the wage gap, its modifying factors, and its 
underlying cause. More specifically, questions addressed are: How big was the gender wage 
gap in Brazil at the time of study? How did it change over time? To what extent can the wage 
gap be understood by differences in characteristics and by unequal treatment, i.e., 
discrimination? The wage determinants as well as its decomposition between observable 
and unobservable characteristics will be analyzed in order to provide answers for these 
questions. 
In the analyses, multivariate regressions (OLS) are estimated. The regression models are 
based on data from the PNADs in 2003, 2008, and 2013. PNAD stands for Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (National Household Survey). This survey obtains 
information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population. Work, 
income, education and other characteristics of the household are collected. With varying 
regularity, data regarding migration, fertility and marriage are also investigated. 
By analyzing, a more recent time (2003-2013) the study seeks to add to the empirical 
literature regarding the wage-gap in the Brazilian labor market using the most recent 
database available. Nonetheless, the aforementioned period is from particular importance 
due to its political and economic context. Nonetheless, the year of 2003 was the first year 
that the Worker’s Party have arisen to power in Brazil and was the only ruling party 
throughout the whole period of study. While presenting an extensive social agenda that even 
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counts with the creation in 2003 of the Secretariat of Policies for Women, this 10-year period 
is a good opportunity to study the effects that this continuity have brought to the labor market 
and consequently the gender wage-gap and its determinants. 
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2. Theory 
In this section, a theoretical framework will be presented. The section is going to be divided 
into three subsections being the first one related to theories that are related to the individuals’ 
productivity (human capital theories) and the second one to theories that are related to 
discriminatory behavior. The last subsection will present the hypothesis underlying the 
present study. 
2.1) Human Capital Theory 
It is possible to verify that in the last 60 years a wide range of microeconomic level studies 
regarding wage inequality have arisen. These studies benefit from the development of 
econometric methods as well as improvements in data collection. Studies of this nature are 
easily found for countries like the United States, Sweden, United Kingdom and other 
developed countries from the Western European block. 
Becker’s (1975) study offers a basic theoretical approach of human capital influence on 
earnings. The effects of education and on-the-job experience are comprehensively 
discussed and it is concluded that both variables provide considerable explanation on wage 
determinants. Adding to the conclusion, the accumulation of both variables by any individual 
would work similarly to an investment where the returns would occur on the long run. 
Nonetheless, the effects of post-school investment are also analyzed as well the shape of 
age-earnings profiles – functions that represents the average earning an individual would 
get throughout life given the educational level. The conclusions were that the returns from 
education are better among individuals with higher educational levels and that earnings 
increase at decreasing rates, tending to stabilize and even slightly decline by the end of the 
individuals’ working life.  
These conclusions are similar to the ones proposed by Schultz (1961), whose study made 
important contributions to the subject while underlining the importance of human capital 
accumulation in forms of education and on-the-job training and its impacts on earnings’ 
profiles, being steeper for individuals with higher educational levels. Nonetheless, the 
inclusion of demographic variables as one of the wage determinants appear as an additional 
factor to be considered when dealing with labor economics. Schultz exemplifies this on the 
migration pattern from the farms to cities, especially at young ages when individuals have 
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enough time to break-even the costs of moving by acquiring more on-the-job experience on 
cities that offer a wider range of job opportunities and more specialized education. 
Once individuals have different productivity characteristics – and that productivity 
characteristics are closely connected to one’s educational level - the Human Capital theory 
argues that it is expected that these differences will be reflected on one’s earnings. However, 
some authors claim that explaining all the differences in terms of human capital 
accumulation is rather simplistic and new theories were suggested to complement the 
previous knowledge. 
Arrow (1973) conducted a study following a line where a new perspective over education is 
presented. It is assumed that education contributes in no way to better economic 
performance but rather, as a screening device. The employer do not know, beforehand, the 
productivity of each individual, on other words, the information is excessively incomplete. In 
this case, the selection process would be based on the employers’ expectation of 
productivity. The higher the educational level, the higher the chances of an individual to have 
a better productivity pattern. The asymmetric information leads employers to use education 
as a filter. 
Stiglitz (1975) also shares the same point of view; however, it is suggested that “screening 
has productivity returns but tends to increase inequality”. The mechanism behind this 
statement is that higher levels of education lead to higher returns but these returns happen 
to be private, on other words, benefit just the owner of the skill, in contrast with social returns 
that would benefit the whole society. If we bring this concept into a gender perspective, it is 
possible to infer that if men are being selected due to some subjective higher productivity – 
in this case, the screening model would not be based purely on the educational level but 
also on gender – the gender gap will be persistent over time despite the efforts of women. 
Even though education and training appear as the most important variables in earnings’ 
determinants, when adding the gender dimension to the earnings inequality framework, a 
new set of socioeconomic variables must be considered in order to sharpen differences in 
productivity. 
One example of this new dimension brought into discussion can be verified on Hartmann’ 
(1981) study, who suggests that the institution of family is a locus of struggle where 
production and redistribution takes place. On this scheme, considering a capitalist and 
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patriarchal society, women are in deep disadvantage since this model benefits households 
with a male head. This context gives men the possibility to “exercise their patriarchal power 
over women’s labor” (Hartmann 1981 p. 377). 
The exercise of this patriarchal power reflects, for example, in the time spent on housework, 
which is predominantly made by women. Housework, under these circumstances, appears 
as a burden since it is energy draining and provides no compensation; heavily impacting on 
women’s productivity. 
Evidences regarding the impact of housework on productivity were already proposed by 
Mincer & Polachek (1974) who, in addition, found that childbearing and marriage do not 
work on women’s benefit (in terms of wages, at least). The discussion of this subject brought 
the conclusion that: “Never-married women spent 90 percent of their years after they left 
school in the labor market, while married women with children spent less than 50 percent of 
their time in it” (p. 81). 
Considering these impacts, men do not just benefit from having the housework done for 
them, but also by being able to specialize themselves on the ongoing job which in turn 
provides higher levels of productivity. This is one of the theories behind the fact that married 
men, on average, experience a wage-premium when compared to never married men. 
Another theory that tries to explain this relies on a selection process, where it is argued that 
men who are successful on the labor market also have some characteristics that are of high 
importance on the marriage market (Blackburn & Korenman 1994, Goldin 1990, Gray 1997). 
It is not the idea of this paper, however, to discuss these theories deeply, but it becomes 
clear that marital status is suggested as a variable with considerable explanatory power 
when working with gender wage gap. 
Nonetheless, the gender wage-gap literature also points to other phenomena that penalize 
women’s earnings, which is the motherhood penalty. The association between motherhood 
and lower wages generated several theories that seek to understand the phenomenon. 
Childcare, for example, would interrupt women’s experience on-the-job or full-time 
employment. Consequently, women would suffer with intermittency. Another explanation is 
that mothers are more willing to accept “mother friendly” jobs that can provide a more flexible 
schedule in order to cope with parenting. Losses of productivity due to childcare could also 
be an explanation regarding the lower earnings. Even discriminatory behavior from the firms 
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– that could assume that women are less productive after becoming mothers – was 
proposed (Waldfogel 1998, Budig & England 2001). 
In the light of the aforementioned theories, it is clear that controlling for maternity is an 
important step to be taken during the model specification since it has direct effects on 
women’s productivity. 
However, not just productivity theories should be considered when studying the earnings of 
both men and women. Discriminatory behavior itself has already been proposed as one of 
the major factors behind the wage-gap. That is exactly what makes some authors believe 
that women’s wages are from custom nature. The next section will present some of these 
theories and its implications on the Human Capital framework. 
 
2.2) Discrimination Theories 
As it was already stated, this section is going to present theories related to general 
discriminatory behavior in the labor market. Even though the theories are not applied to a 
specific group, they could easily be applied under a gender level perspective. 
The systematic study on wage discrimination began with Gary Becker (1957) when 
analyzing why workers with similar personal characteristics and job attributes were paid 
differently according to gender, skin color and religion. It was concluded that minority 
workers must compensate the discriminatory penalty by being more productive. The 
mechanism behind this compensation would be accepting lower wages for an equivalent 
productivity. The importance of this study relies on the fact that this was the first time that 
discrimination effects were being observed in the micro-level. 
In the aforementioned study conducted by Becker (1957), discriminatory behavior is 
established as a “taste” for the employers to discriminate certain groups. This approach is 
known in the general literature as personal prejudice. Personal prejudice models consider 
discrimination as an endogenous variable on the employers’ decision to hire. It can be 
summarized as the preference of hiring certain individuals belonging to certain groups 
regardless productivity levels. 
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However, personal prejudice models are not the only approach verified in the literature to 
address the problem of discriminatory behavior. Other approaches consist in statistical 
prejudice models and imperfect competition. 
Arrow (1971), as an example of statistical prejudice models, have suggested that firms have 
limited information regarding the potential employees. Some employers may choose 
workers based on certain personal characteristics believing that this provide some evidence 
regarding the workers’ productivity levels given that it is not possible – or either too 
expensive – to obtain information regarding one’s productivity beforehand. 
Therefore, it is possible to infer that statistical prejudice models deal with the concept of 
asymmetric information. Employers would use information regarding group affiliation – 
education, for example – to infer non-observable characteristics of individuals. This could 
be extended to gender. It is argued that this would be a rational decision of the employers 
since the goal is to maximize expected profit and in some cases, the cost of gaining 
information about the applicants is too big (Phelps, 1972). 
The last important consideration regarding discriminatory behavior concerns to imperfect 
competition models. It is important to mention that these models use the concept of 
inequality on job opportunities as the backbone for its construction. Piore (1972) proposes 
the existence of a dual labor market with different opportunities, target public and labor 
conditions on each of them. These two branches in the labor market were labelled as primary 
and secondary sector. On the primary sector, one would find the best job opportunities that 
provide employment and financial stability, lower levels of turnover and high wages. The 
secondary sector would be the opposite; with lower wages, high instability and high levels 
of turnover. The idea is that certain people due to some characteristics such as gender or 
ethnicity would not be able to find positions in the primary sector, but just for the secondary. 
That would lead to an occupational segregation and inequality among different groups. It is 
worth mentioning that these models differ from statistical prejudice models because the bias 
is within the workers, who arguably would look for jobs in the sector in which the probability 
of being hired is bigger. In statistical prejudice models, as already mentioned, the employer 
is the one who discriminates. However, one could argue that workers, by expecting 
discriminatory behavior from the firms, would look for jobs in the secondary sector. 
Considering these hypothesis, imperfect competition models would be closely connected 
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with statistical prejudice models differing only on the entity who is going to take the first 
action (employer of employee). 
Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that discrimination in the labor market exists and it 
could be a plausible explanation behind the gender wage-bap. 
With the theoretical foundations established, it is equally important to discuss the hypothesis 
adopted by this study in order to explore the gender wage-gap in Brazil. They are going to 
be presented in the next section. 
2.3) Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical framework mentioned in the last section, it is assumed that an 
efficient labor market will pay its individuals according to productivity standards. 
If that assessment is true, then the differences in wages must be accounted purely for 
productivity factors. In other words, no differential in wages is unexplained. They would 
account for the individual capability of accumulate human capital and be more productive at 
work. 
In the case where a portion of the differential is not explained by productivity characteristics, 
evidences on discriminatory behavior have to be considered. 
In order to test whether or not discrimination in Brazil accounts for a portion in the wage 
differential, an analysis on previous research as well as an empirical estimation based on 
OLS models and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is going to be conducted. Both 
analyses are going to be presented in the following sections being previous research in the 
next one and the empirical estimations further in this study (section 4 and beyond). 
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3. Previous Research 
The discussion regarding the Brazilian wage-gap is heavily focused on discriminatory 
theories. In the light of studies done in the 1980’s and 1990’s, it has been already suggested 
that the gender wage-gap in Brazil was related in a larger extent to market discrimination 
rather than solely on individual characteristics since women’s educational levels are as big 
as men’s as well as professional experience. Nonetheless, the returns are still better for men 
(Barros et al 1995; Leme & Wajnman 2000, Madalozzo, 2010, Wajnman 2013). 
Barros et al (1995), used wage differentials on 500,000 observations between 1981 and 
1989, consisting of men and women from 25 to 50 years of age in urban areas. 
Discriminatory issues in the Brazilian labor market might be explained as: “(…) if one takes 
into account gender differences in the occupational structure, educational attainment, and 
age distribution, the wage gap between gender increases. In other words, the discrimination 
by gender, as far as wages go, is even more pronounced than what one would find through 
a simple comparison between male and female wages.” (Barros et al 1995, p. 424). 
In line with the conclusions of the aforementioned study, Biderman & Stefani (2006) also 
note the existence of discrimination on Brazilian labor market. The methodology adopted 
was the use of quantile regressions across the earnings distribution. The idea consisted on 
disaggregation of the earnings distribution regarding gender and skin color. The conclusions 
were drawn by the comparison between the disaggregated quantiles. 
The first finding was – not surprisingly - that returns to education were heterogeneous among 
the quantiles being the upper 10% (in the earnings distribution) the most privileged in terms 
of returns. However, the most interesting conclusion was concerning gender; the causes of 
wage (and returns) disparity were “mainly accounted by discrimination factors” (Biderman & 
Stefani 2006, p.5). 
Carvalho, Neri and Silva (2006), in line with Biderman and Stefani’s study, also combine the 
effects of gender and ethnicity on the approach to the wage-gap. In this case, however, 
quantile regressions were not applied. The methodology chosen was the estimation of the 
wage-gap through OLS models and a further decomposition of the gap was made through 
the Oaxaca-Blinder procedure. As most of the literature, professional experience and 
education were the main determinants in the estimation of the earnings equation. Since the 
authors did not apply any restrictions on the database regarding working individuals, a 
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Heckman correction model (Heckman 1979) to eliminate the problem of selection bias was 
made. It was demonstrated that, if the selection bias is not corrected, one might 
underestimate the effects of discrimination. 
Despite these considerations, the study provided results that confirmed discriminatory 
behavior as the most important component on the explanation behind the gender wage-gap. 
It was found that more than 170% of the gap between white males and white females was 
due to discrimination. When comparing white males with black females, the discriminatory 
component accounted for 97% of the difference.  
Both Carvalho, Neri and Silva’s and Biderman and Stefani’s studies are unique since 
discrimination in the Brazilian labor market is addressed under both an ethnical and gender 
perspective, and not separately like most of the studies in that subject. 
However, other approaches on this subject like occupation segregation are also considered 
to explore the gender wage-gap. Even though the existence of discrimination is never 
discarded, some studies provide a perspective that goes beyond simply the productivity 
characteristics and consider market composition and gender segregation within different 
occupations. 
Menezes-Filho et al (2007), for example, when analyzing the market composition regarding 
occupational segregation on the manufacturing sector, suggested that discrimination 
accounts for as much as personal characteristics when explaining the wage-gap. 
In a broader approach towards market composition and occupational segregation, 
Madalozzo (2010) investigates the connection between these variables and earnings in both 
formal and informal sectors, finding more evidences of discrimination: “when both have the 
same characteristics, men are better paid then women” (Madalozzo 2010, p.166). 
This issue is also present in studies across sectors. Silva and Kassouf (2000) also 
conducted an analysis among different sectors finding that the wage gap both in the formal 
and informal labor market sectors declined over the recent decades but surprisingly the gaps 
were larger in the formal sector. At least, the gap was reducing more significantly in the 
formal sector, possibly due to decreasing levels of discrimination as suggested by Salardi 
(2010) when studying the gender and racial differentials over the late 80’s and 90’s. 
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As it is possible to verify in the literature presented, the use of wage differentials as a tool to 
analyze the wage gap as well the use of models that take into account professional 
experience, educational level and other socioeconomic variables are the key on 
understanding the wage gap and its determinants. The methodology that is going to be used 
in this study is similar to the ones already presented – especially Barros et al (1995), 
Carvalho, Neri and Silva (2006) and Madalozzo (2010) – and will be further detailed in the 
next section.  
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4. Data and Methodology  
In this section, a more detailed analysis of the data and the methodology is going to be 
presented. A discussion regarding the variables selected as well as the first estimates and 
its implications are also going to be conducted. 
4.1) Data 
As already stated in the introductory section, this study consists in the PNADs (Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) for the years 2003, 2008 and 2013. 
Since the database in question is obtained through survey, questions regarding the nature 
of the sampling process may arise. For a more comprehensive approach of the sampling 
process used on PNAD, Silva et al (2002) is recommended. This article demonstrates - by 
the use of PNAD 1998 – that not considering strategies of stratification, clustering and 
weighting on model estimations, will lead to wrong estimates, which in turn, generates 
interpretation problems (p. 660). 
In the light of these considerations, samples not randomly chosen require the use of weights 
to correct any eventual distortions. The IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
– Brazilian Bureau of Statistcs) already provides a weighted version for each PNAD every 
year. The weights consider the population projection from Brazil concerning gender and 
years of age. The goal of these projections is to adjust the database from eventual biases 
during the sampling process. Therefore, all the data used in this study is already considering 
these weights. For a more detailed explanation on the weights used and its implications, 
IBGE (2013) is suggested. 
With the most general issues being addressed, it is important to underline that each of the 
PNADs being used have more than 300.000 observations where more than 320 different 
variables are being analyzed. By keeping the database as is, problems with selection bias 
may arise. 
There are two existing reasons that would lead a database to contain selection bias: the 
case where samples were not randomly chosen by the data collector or the case of self-
selection by the individuals. Considering that the first case was already addressed as 
mentioned in the paragraphs above, the focus for now on will be in the latter case. 
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Self-selection occurs when questions proposed by the survey can just be answered for 
certain class of individuals. One example is reported wage. It is just possible for an individual 
to have reported wage if this individual have a reported job. Therefore, all unemployed 
individuals will have a reported wage of zero. However, some unemployed individuals are 
just unemployed due to the cost of opportunity to get a job. To illustrate this situation, it is 
possible to imagine an individual who is unemployed under the labor market perspective but 
performs the housework because the cost of hiring someone to look after the house is higher 
than the wage this individual would get if he/she worked in the labor market. Therefore, from 
an economic point of view, this individual would have an occupation where the wage would 
be marginally lower than the cost of paying someone else to do it, even though the reported 
wage is zero. This phenomenon is usually classified in the literature as “reservation wage”. 
In order to address the reservation wage problem, either a Heckman correction procedure 
should be conducted or a restriction may be applied on the database in order to correct the 
bias. This study considers, only individuals with a reported primary job1 in the formal market, 
older than 18 years of age, non-retired, with positive income and living in urban areas. In 
that case, the correction procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) is not needed since just 
working individuals are the subject of this study and no cost of opportunity will be accounted. 
Since the general aspects concerning the database were discussed, it is possible to proceed 
to the next section where an overview of the theoretical model and the variables that are 
going to be considered in this study will be presented. After concluding the model 
presentation, a more detailed description of the variables is going to be conducted alongside 
the first estimations and its interpretations.  
4.2) Theoretical Model 
In line with the theories aforementioned on section 2, the theoretical model that is going to 
be used in order to measure the wage differentials is presented as it follows: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑏, ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟,  
𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦, 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) 
                                                          
1 It is not unusual to find people in Brazil with more than one job. On PNAD, the income of all jobs are 
analyzed individually. For this research, just the income of individuals’ primary job (the one which most 
hours are spent in a week) is going to be consider. 
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The dependent variable – represented by “income” – is the hourly wage in Brazilian reais 
(BRL) from each individual’s primary job. 
The variables age, tenure on the job, hours of housework and educational level intend to 
capture the effects of productivity on individuals’ earnings. Other variables as gender, 
ethnical group, region of residence, position within the family and family structure add to the 
model as modifying factors on wages’ estimation. 
A detailed analysis regarding both theoretical and empirical aspects of the selected variables 
is going to be conducted throughout this section as well as a detailed description of the 
variables. A table of summary statistics is presented in the Appendix. 
4.2.1) Age 
The variable age intends to capture the effect of age itself – and it squared component – on 
the earnings. The measurement is made in years of age and it was reported for all individuals 
in the sample. 
4.2.2) Tenure on the Job 
In order to represent professional experience, this study proposes the variable “Tenure on 
the Job”. Unfortunately, this variable is not provided directly on the PNADs; being required 
its construction.  
Obtaining this variable requires the use of other two variables that are related with 
professional experience. The first variable is the number of years on the current job and 
second one is number of months on the current job (PNAD reports these as two different 
variables resulting in a composition of years and months at the current job. Ex.: Four years 
and three months); by summing them both, we reach on the total tenure on the current job, 
which is going to be presented in months. Therefore, the definition of “tenure on the job” is: 
𝑇𝑜𝐽𝑖 = (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑖) ∗ 12 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑖 
Before proceeding to the next variables, it is interesting to underline the importance of this 
measurement since some studies consider age as a proxy for experience. 
However, once the estimation consists on establishing an equation suitable to both men and 
women, this proxy may not the be best approach since women may experience periods of 
labor intermittency – as already discussed on the previous chapters – and the variable age 
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itself would not be enough to capture this effect. Nonetheless, this effect can be partially 
captured by the variable “tenure on the job” proposed in this study.  
The limitations regarding this variable are acknowledged but, considering the theoretical 
framework underlying the importance of professional experience on the evolution of 
earnings and knowing the limitations that can be incurred by using age as proxy, it was 
considered by the author better to have this variable as it was described rather than not 
having any. 
4.2.3) Hours of Housework 
The inclusion of one variable to represent hours spent on housework is based on Hartmann 
(1981) who clearly suggests that the role of patriarchy on the unequal division of labor within 
the household is one factor preventing women to achieve higher productivity levels on the 
labor market. Therefore, this variable intends to capture the loss of productivity that this 
activity implicate on the individuals performing it. The measurement is made in hours per 
week. 
4.2.4) Educational Level 
The variable “educational level” aims to capture the effects of the individuals’ educational 
level on earnings. The treatment for this variable consists in the division of the educational 
level within different categories. This approach was preferred over the continuous approach 
since it is assumed that different years of education does not provide the same return on 
wages to the individual. Nonetheless, this approach is in line with theories that consider 
education as a screening device – as already mentioned on section 4.2 – as it can be verified 
on Arrow (1973) and Stiglitz (1975). The categories follow the pattern below:  
- “No education” for individuals with zero years of education; 
- 1-4 years of education; 
- 5-8 years of education; 
- 9-12 years of education; 
- 13 or more years of education; 
4.2.5) Gender  
Captures the effect of gender on earnings. Divided between male and female. 
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4.2.6) Ethnical Group 
The variable “ethnicity” will represent the ethnical group of each individual in the database. 
In this study, two categories were defined: Majority and minority. 
The definition of majority and minority in an ethnical diverse society like Brazil requires the 
establishment of a number of assumptions and definitions.  
First, it is necessary to know how PNAD defines ethnicity. The survey relies on a sentence 
that requires the respondent to fulfill the following statement: “A cor ou raça do(a) é: ” (The 
color or race of the dweller is2:). The possible answers are white, black, yellow, brown or 
indigenous. 
From that, it was defined in this study that the individuals belonging to the white category 
would be labelled as “majority”. All the other categories were labelled as “minority”. 
The reasons underlying the author’s choice are based on a socioeconomic definition where 
white individuals are representing the ruling class. 
To understand the condition in which individuals of white skin color emerged as the ruling 
class in Brazil, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the immigration and colonization 
process that Brazil have gone over the last 500 years. The following paragraphs aim to 
briefly provide the necessary context. 
The Portuguese realm claimed the territory known nowadays as Brazil in the year 1500 and 
by the year of 1532, the first settlement was established in the southeast coast of the newly 
discovered lands. 
The administration of this territory was made through a Captaincy system. A Captaincy 
would work similarly to an independent territory within the Portuguese Empire with the 
obligation to pay a previously defined amount of taxes. At the beginning, fifteen Captaincies 
were defined and each Captaincy had a governor who was directly appointed by the King of 
Portugal. The governors had – in practice – absolute powers over its own Captaincy and 
were the responsible to ensure the profitable exploitation of the available resources (Fausto 
1994). 
                                                          
2 Author’s Translation 
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Despite the beliefs that a more decentralized power would be the best choice to administrate 
the overseas territories, in 1549 only two out of fifteen Captaincies were profitable for the 
Portuguese Crown. In the light of this failure, it was established that all the Captaincies would 
be under direct supervision of a General Governor – which was also appointed by the King 
of Portugal – and would represent the direct interests of the king in the colonial 
administration. 
The first Governor appointed was a nobleman named Tomé de Souza. He arrived in the 
Captaincy of Bahia with a considerable number of settlers – some reports stating that they 
were more than a thousand – and with Jesuit priests. The responsibilities of Tomé de Souza 
included not just to provide better conditions on the resources’ exploitation but also to 
convert the native population to Catholicism. To achieve these goals, several bureaucratic 
position within the public service were created. These position were mainly occupied by 
other Portuguese noblemen (Fausto 1994). 
This system, as it is possible to infer, would ensure that a European – white - elite would be 
in charge of all colonial affairs. The aforementioned elite, especially in the northeast 
Captaincies, had an aristocratic and patriarchal mindset as well as well-known interests 
regarding slavery and its maintenance (Freyre 1933). 
Slavery in Brazil consisted in black men and women that were brought from the African west 
coast. The slave trade became established in the beginning of the XVI century and aimed 
to provide work force for the sugarcane fields. It was just abolished in 1888. Therefore, for 
more than 300 years, black men and women had absolute no status as citizens and by the 
end of the slavery years, it is not surprising that an enormous socioeconomic difference was 
found among black and white people. 
The end of slavery represented a turning point in Brazilian society. Aristocrats who relied in 
the income provided by their massive lands could not rely on slaves to do the work anymore. 
In order to find other ways to obtain cheap labor, incentives for an immigration process 
started to take place in Brazil. During the XIX and XX century, a massive number of 
immigrants from the Middle East and East Asia arrived in the country and, despite being 
considered free people “In the nineteenth century some powerful intellectuals and politicians 
sought ‘pure’ European immigrants who would re-create the Old World in the New” (Lesser 
1999, p. 10-11).  
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Therefore, problems to integrate in the Brazilian society were not exclusive from black 
people. In reality, all immigrants that were not ethnical white would suffer prejudice and be 
marginalized in society. These historical reasons are the backbone on the definition of 
“Majority” and “Minority” proposed earlier in this section.  
4.2.7) Region of Residence 
The variable “region of residence” was included to capture the effects that different regions 
may have upon ones’ income. Being Brazil a big and unequal country the living standards 
within different regions may differ a lot, being the Southeast notably the most industrial and 
competitive region in the country while the North/Northeast are the regions with lower 
average income with a prevalence of an agrarian sector in several states. The Federal 
District, even though located on the Brazilian center-west region, is being treated separately 
once it has a very peculiar socioeconomic pattern since the high public administration is 
concentrated within the district. As a result, extremely high levels of average income are 
found in the Federal District, which may distort the inter-regional analysis if not treated 
separately. 
Considering the nature of this variable, categories were created to capture the effects that 
different regions have upon individuals’ income. The categories are: 
- North; 
- Northeast; 
- Southeast; 
- South; 
- Central West; 
- Federal District. 
4.2.8) Position within the Family 
“Position within the family” appears as an interesting variable to capture the effect of being 
the head of the house on ones’ earnings. Since this title is predominantly male, it is useful 
when analyzing the gender wage-gap. Alongside “Hours of housework” this variable is also 
based on the theoretical framework on patriarchy and its effects on women (Hartman 1981). 
Nonetheless, empirical studies conducted on the Brazilian wage-gap also considered this 
variable on wages’ estimation as it could be seen on Carvalho, Neri and Silva (2006). 
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As other variables proposed in this study, “Position within the family” is a categorical variable 
presented as: 
- Head of the family; 
- Not head of the family. 
4.2.9) Family Structure 
The variable “family structure” intends to capture the effects of the presence of children in 
the house. As already discussed on previous sections, the presence of children in the house 
is one factor affecting individuals’ productivity. It is important to note, however, that the 
variable provided by the PNAD is considering the presence of sons/daughters at home and 
not the general presence of kids, being that case part of a different categorization. 
The categorization of this variable is presented as it follows: 
- No kids at home; 
- Kids younger than 14 years of age; 
- Kids older than 14 years of age; 
- Kids younger and older than 14 years of age. 
- Other family structures. 
It is important to note that the first category contains individuals who do not have kids living 
at home anymore as well as childless couples. The second category consider individuals 
whose all kids are living in the house are younger than 14 years of age. Following the same 
pattern, the third category considers individuals whose kids living in the house are all older 
than 14 years of age and the fourth category consider individuals whose kids living in the 
house are both older and younger than 14 years of age. The last category consider family 
structures that are not easily defined (couples who live with their grandchildren, for example) 
since this variable accounts specifically for the presence of sons/daughters but not for the 
presence of children in the house, as stated before. These observations were kept in the 
analysis since it consists of almost 9000 individuals and these might provide useful 
information regarding other variables. 
Being “Family Structure” the last variable to be described, this study will proceed with the 
first estimations of the proposed model alongside a brief explanation of the results and its 
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implications. For information regarding summary statistics as well as a summarized 
description of the variables being used, Tables 11 and 12 are provided in the Appendix. 
4.3) First estimates and Modifying factors 
The first estimates to be presented are going to be focused just on the productivity factors 
mentioned on section 4.2. The idea is to provide information regarding the effects of 
productivity – and nothing else – on individuals’ wages. Nonetheless, a gender dummy will 
be added to this model so the effects of productivity get clear for both genders. 
It is important to note that all the models are considering robust standards errors so it is 
possible to have some control for heteroskedasticity. This is valid for all the OLS estimates 
throughout this study. 
The model is presented in the table below: 
Table 1 – First OLS Estimates excluding modifying factors 
 
Source: Authors calculations from PNADs (2003, 2008 and 2013)            *Not significant at a 5% level 
Since the independent variable (Log of hourly wage) is logged, all the coefficients must be 
interpreted in terms of percentages. In order to provide an easier analysis, the table below 
express the results in terms of these percentages concerning the change in one unit in each 
Log hourly wage, BRL 2003 2008 2013
Age 0,014 0,043 0,034
Age, squared 0,000 0,000 0,000
Tenure on the Job 0,002 0,002 0,002
Hours of Housework -0,001 -0,003 -0,002
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 0,197 0,076 -0,051
From 5-8 years 0,408 0,239 0,098
From 9-11 years 0,751 0,532 0,325
From 13+ years 1,626 1,339 1,068
Gender
Male ref ref ref
Female -0,255 -0,225 -0,211
Constant -0,015* 0,090 0,927
Observations 62.628 75.462 78.145
Adjusted R2 0,459 0,465 0,333
F-test (P > F) 0,000 0,000 0,000
24 
 
of the variables. It is important to note that the Constant was suppressed due to the lack of 
interpretation power when analyzed under a percentage perspective. 
Table 2 - First OLS Estimates excluding modifying factors (percentages) 
 
Source: See Table 1.                          *Not significant at a 5% level 
As it can be observed on Table 2 the behavior of the variables follow the theoretical 
framework. Age has a positive impact on wages and its squared component is negative, 
pointing that wage increases at decreasing rates and, eventually, reaching a maximum 
point. This effect is not clear for the year of 2003 due to the small value of the coefficient for 
age squared. 
Tenure on the job has also results according to the theory, pointing that for each additional 
month on the job, an individual might experience an average increase around 0,2% on the 
hourly wage. This coefficient was stable in a year over year analysis, suggesting that the 
returns to experience did not have any significant change. 
Surprisingly, the effects of the hours spent on housework during the week have a stronger 
impact than tenure on the job itself. In the year of 2008, for example, for each additional 
hour spent weekly on housework, an individual would experience, on average, a decrease 
of 0,35% on the hourly wage. 
Log hourly wage, BRL 2003 2008 2013
Age 1,36% 4,35% 3,47%
Age, squared 0,00% -0,04% -0,03%
Tenure on the Job 0,19% 0,18% 0,16%
Hours of Housework -0,13% -0,35% -0,24%
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 21,82% 7,88% -4,94%
From 5-8 years 50,44% 27,06% 10,27%
From 9-11 years 111,87% 70,20% 38,38%
From 13+ years 408,43% 281,40% 190,82%
Gender
Male ref ref ref
Female -22,51% -20,14% -19,06%
Observations 62.628 75.462 78.145
Adjusted R2 0,459 0,465 0,333
F-test (P > F) 0,000 0,000 0,000
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Despite the effect of the aforementioned variables, education appeared as the variable with 
the stronger impact on wages. However, when analyzing year over year, it is possible to 
verify that the returns are decreasing for all categories. 
The reasons for this phenomenon are not the aim of this study; however, the table below 
might provide some evidence: 
Table 3 – Average years of education in Brazilian Labor Market 
 
Source: See table 1 
As it is possible to infer, educational levels in the labor market among the individuals being 
considered in the sample have increased in more than a year in the last ten years. If 
professionals that are more skilled are joining the labor market, it is natural that education 
faces decreasing returns due to the increasing competition.  
The last variable to interpret is the gender dummy. Women, on average, are earning around 
20% less than men in all the years being considered. This is consistent with the gap when 
comparing the raw averages provided by the descriptive statistics on table 11 in the 
Appendix. In percentage terms, the descriptive statistics provide gaps of 29% for 2003, 26% 
for 2008 and 23% for 2013. Therefore, the behavior of the gender dummy somehow follows 
the same behavior of the raw averages, with a decreasing trend. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is, at least, interesting if we consider 
that the model is controlling for productivity factors. That means that the coefficient 
representing this 20% penalty for women is computing something else that is not being 
captured by the productivity variables that were added. 
Despite that fact, the penalty is diminishing throughout the period. However, a more precise 
analysis regarding its behavior can only be done after adding the modifying factors proposed 
on section 4.2. Nonetheless, by adding the modifying factors, the coefficients – especially 
the gender dummy – will represent better estimates since the model is going to be controlling 
for additional variables. 
Year Mean
2003 10,17
2008 10,84
2013 11,32
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The results of the estimates including the modifying factors can be seen on the tables 4 and 
5. In order to be consistent with the procedure already adopted, first a model with the 
numerical estimates will be presented followed by a model with its estimates in percentage 
terms.  
All the productivity factors, despite maintaining the same direction, had their impacts 
lowered. This is expected since more variables that will capture distinct effects were added 
to the model.  
Good examples are variables like ethnicity and region of residence, which contribute to 
wages’ explanation in a significant way. As expected, individuals belonging to the majority 
group have an advantage – on average – of around 10% in their incomes when compared 
to individuals belonging to the minority group. When it comes to region of residence, the 
Federal District appears as the region that provides the biggest returns to the individuals, 
heavily influenced by the concentration of the highest public administration workers 
allocated in the country’s capital, Brasília. It is important to highlight that the North region 
was set as the reference category; therefore, all the returns provided are being compared 
to the returns that individuals living in the North of Brazil would experience. However, since 
the goal of this variable is solely to capture the geographical effect existing on wages’ 
composition, a discussion regarding the reasons for the different returns is not going to be 
made. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that the South and the Southeast regions of Brazil are 
the most industrialized ones, the results are according to the Brazilian reality. 
Position within the family also showed a significant impact with a decreasing trend over the 
years. Most of the family heads are men and the fact that the coefficients were significant 
and negative is a sign that this effect were partially being captured by the gender dummy on 
the first estimates. Despite the diminishing trend, it is clear that patriarchy still has an 
important role on wages’ composition. 
The variable Family Structure also provides an interesting explanation and in line with 
theory. Using individuals with no kids at home (either no kids living at home anymore or 
childless individuals) as the reference category, shows that the presence of kids will affect 
the wages negatively, highlighting the loss of productivity that is associated with child raising.  
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Table 4 - OLS Estimates with modifying factors  
 
Source: See Table 1                 *Not significant at a 5% level 
 
  
Log hourly wage, BRL 2003 2008 2013
Age 0,012 0,038 0,030
Age, squared 0,000 0,000 0,000
Tenure on the Job 0,002 0,002 0,002
Hours of Housework -0,002 -0,004 -0,003
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 0,146 0,055 -0,054
From 5-8 years 0,341 0,207 0,083
From 9-11 years 0,700 0,505 0,310
From 13+ years 1,529 1,278 1,023
Gender
Male ref ref ref
Female -0,181 -0,197 -0,190
Ethnical Group
Majority ref ref ref
Minority -0,126 -0,109 -0,107
Region of Residence
North ref ref ref
Northeast -0,171 -0,136 -0,159
Southeast 0,091 0,061 0,012*
South 0,062 0,060 0,012*
Central West -0,022 0,006* -0,025
Federal District 0,378 0,377 0,293
Position within the family
Head ref ref ref
Not Head -0,139 -0,081 -0,066
Family Structure
No Kids ref ref ref
Kids with 14 y/o or less 0,016 -0,005* -0,002*
Kids with older than 14 y/o -0,090 -0,076 -0,086
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o -0,056 -0,058 -0,061
Other family structure -0,034 -0,022 -0,015*
Constant 0,231 0,342 1,184
Observations 62.628 75.462 78.145
Adjusted R2 0,505 0,500 0,358
F-test (P > F) 0,000 0,000 0,000
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Table 5 – OLS Estimates with modifying factors (percentages) 
 
Source: See Table 1                    *Not significant at a 5% level 
  
Log hourly wage, BRL 2003 2008 2013
Age 1,17% 3,82% 3,03%
Age, squared 0,00% -0,04% -0,03%
Tenure on the Job 0,20% 0,18% 0,17%
Hours of Housework -0,23% -0,40% -0,31%
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 15,76% 5,62% -5,26%
From 5-8 years 40,57% 23,03% 8,69%
From 9-11 years 101,29% 65,75% 36,38%
From 13+ years 361,58% 258,84% 178,22%
Gender
Male ref ref ref
Female -16,56% -17,88% -17,33%
Ethnical Group
Majority ref ref ref
Minority -11,81% -10,37% -10,14%
Region of Residence
North ref ref ref
Northeast -15,74% -12,71% -14,67%
Southeast 9,56% 6,34% 1,20%*
South 6,38% 6,18% 1,20%*
Central West -2,19% 0,60%* -2,46%
Federal District 45,91% 45,82% 34,08%
Position within the family
Head ref ref ref
Not Head -13,00% -7,77% -6,35%
Family Structure
No Kids ref ref ref
Kids with 14 y/o or less 1,61% -0,49%* -0,19%*
Kids with older than 14 y/o -8,56% -7,33% -8,24%
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o -5,47% -5,68% -5,96%
Other family structure -3,38% -2,16% -1,48%*
Observations 62.628 75.462 78.145
Adjusted R2 0,505 0,500 0,358
F-test (P > F) 0 0 0
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The aforementioned effects on the gender dummy were clear, which now accounts for a 
penalty around 17% (the first estimates provided a penalty of 20%). It is interesting to note, 
however, that in the first estimates, the gender dummy showed a declining trend throughout 
the years and now, after adding the modifying factors, it became more stable and even 
showing a slightly growing trend. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this variable does 
not represent the wage-gap itself but just evidence of its existence and trend. Furthermore, 
it is not possible to infer anything regarding the composition of the wage-gap and whether 
or not discrimination accounts for part of it by just interpreting the model presented. In order 
to analyze the gap more precisely and determine its size and composition, it is necessary to 
evaluate the specific returns that women and men would experience for each of the variables 
being tested in this study. By finding gender-specific equations and replacing the variables 
for the averages of each gender it is possible to reach a better estimate regarding the wage-
gap. Once this is done, by applying the decomposition method developed by Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973), an analysis regarding the composition of the gap and the existence of 
discrimination is possible. 
The procedure mentioned above will be further clarified in the next section, which aims to 
highlight the decomposition methodology being used as well as its implications and 
interpretations. 
4.4) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method 
The theoretical model presented can be written as it follows: 
 ln 𝑤𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖                                                 (1) 
Where 𝑤 stands for the individual’s wage and the subscript 𝑖 represents each individual in 
the sample. β is a  parameter while 𝑋 is the individuals’ characteristics (including both the 
productivity and modifying factors). 𝜀 represents the error term in the estimation. 
The aforementioned equation represents the earnings function for a general individual, 
regardless gender. Since the idea of this study is to compare the wage gap between genders 
and further decompose it on observable and unobservable characteristics, it is necessary to 
decompose the equation itself using gender as the determinant. The following represent this 
first decomposition: 
30 
 
ln 𝑤𝑖
𝑚 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑚
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑚 +  𝜀𝑖                                       (2)  
ln 𝑤𝑖
𝑓 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑓
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑓 +  𝜀𝑖                                         (3) 
While 𝑚 is the superscript representing males, 𝑓 is the superscript representing females. 
Once the parameters from both equations are estimated – through ordinary least squares – 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be used to determine the wage differentials and its 
observable and unobservable components.  
The differential is calculated by subtracting (2) from (3): 
𝐷 = (∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑚
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑚 +   𝜀𝑖) − (∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑓
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑓  + 𝜀𝑖 )   
Denoting E(X) as the expected value of the outcome variable and assuming that 𝜀𝑖= 0 based 
on Ordinary Least Squares assumptions, we have: 
𝐷 = 𝐸 (∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑚
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑚) − 𝐸 (∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑓
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑖
𝑓 )   
Considering that 𝐸(𝑋𝛽) = 𝐸(𝑋)′𝛽 where the superscript represents the estimated value: 
𝐷 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑚)′𝛽𝑚 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑓)′𝛽𝑓  
Reorganizing the terms: 
                       𝐷 = 𝐸[(𝑋𝑚) − (𝑋𝑓)]
′
𝛽𝑚 + 𝐸(𝑋𝑓)
′
[𝛽𝑚 − 𝛽𝑓]             (4) 
The equation (4) is the decomposition among the explained and the unexplained part of the 
differential. While the first term 𝐸[(𝑋𝑚) − (𝑋𝑓)]
′
𝛽𝑚 represents the difference in the 
characteristics, the second term 𝐸(𝑋𝑓)
′
[𝛽𝑚 − 𝛽𝑓] represents the differences in the 
endowments. The idea is to estimate the earnings women would receive if they had the 
same characteristics as men do and the earnings that women would receive if they had the 
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same returns as men do. The first term would account for observable differences since they 
do account for the characteristics; the second term account for non-observable 
characteristics, which is usually attributed to discrimination since the component relies in the 
difference in the returns. 
Before proceeding to the results of the decomposition, one observation is important when 
dealing with the categorical variables during the procedure. 
Considering that ethnicity, years of education, region of residence and other variables in the 
model are categorical variables – on other words, dummy -  the simple Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition is not enough to provide the results that are being pursued by this study since 
this procedure is sensitive to the variable left out – the reference variable for each dummy. 
This issue leads to a specification problem since the reference category may vary according 
to one’s wish to study a specific effect. 
In order to solve this problem, Yun (2003) have proposed a normalization process to deal 
with the different possibilities while determining the reference category for each dummy. The 
idea is to estimate all possible combinations of reference groups and take the average of 
the estimates for each case in order to build the average effect. 
The result is equivalent of “finding average estimates of constant and dummy variables in 
wage equations with varying reference groups and then using the average estimates to 
calculate Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition equation” (Yun 2003, p. 2-3). 
Once the normalization procedure is taken into account, the results can be properly 
discussed in the next section, where they are also presented. 
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5. Results 
By following the methodology described in the last section, it is possible to reach a range of 
outputs that provide valuable information for the purposes of this study. These outputs are: 
gender-specific regressions, adjusted average wages and adjusted wage-gap with its 
decomposition. Therefore, in this section, all these components are going to be presented 
alongside a discussion regarding the results found. 
5.1) Gender-specific Regressions 
The Gender-specific regressions are nothing more than the output of the equations (2) and 
(3) that were presented on section 4.4. The importance of these estimates relies on the fact 
that they provide the specific returns for each variable according to gender. Differently than 
the first estimates or even from the estimates with the modifying factors, these equations 
allow this study to verify if men and women are experiencing differences in their returns for 
the same variables, which is the backbone of the decomposition method and the first step 
for a better understanding of the gender discrepancies found in the labor market. 
In order to provide an easy interpretation of the results, just the output in percentage terms 
is going to be displayed in this section (Table 6). The numerical estimates can be found in 
the Appendix on table 13. 
As it is possible to observe on Table 6, men have better returns than women in a range of 
variables. Educational Level is the most notable one with men having consistently better 
returns for all categories in all the years that are being analyzed. Once knowing that 
education is one of the most important productivity factors and has a central role on the 
Human Capital theory, finding considerable differences in returns is worrisome. 
Nonetheless, when considering age, despite the year of 2003 when the returns are virtually 
the same for both genders, men have also consistent better returns in the subsequent years 
for an additional year of age. 
Tenure on the job also shows a slightly advantage to men, especially on years 2003 and 
2008. On other words, men are having better returns for each additional month on the job. 
This implicates that the market somehow values the experience that men accumulate 
“better” than the experience accumulated by women.  
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Table 6 – OLS estimates with modifying factors sorted by gender (percentages) 
 
Source: See Table 1                *Not significant at a 5% level 
Moving to the modifying factors, is it also clear that the returns are different under a gender 
perspective but it is not clear whether or not men or women are the most penalized by the 
differences in returns since each variable shows an specific behavior. For this assessment, 
each variable must be analyzed separately. The following paragraphs provide this analysis. 
Log hourly wage, BRL Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 1,12% 1,14% 4,29% 3,19% 3,38% 2,61%
Age, squared 0,00% 0,00% -0,04% 0,30% -0,03% -0,03%
Tenure on the Job 0,21% 0,18% 0,19% 0,17% 0,16% 0,17%
Hours of Housework -0,27% -0,23% -0,46% -0,38% -0,18% -0,35%
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 17,72% 9,89% 7,72% -0,26%* -2,88%* -10,41%
From 5-8 years 47,14% 26,72% 28,55% 11,13% 13,17% -0,21%*
From 9-11 years 106,68% 86,14% 71,76% 50,47% 42,24% 24,34%
From 13+ years 404,28% 307,74% 289,33% 215,07% 193,30% 151,69%
Ethnical Group
Majority ref ref ref ref ref ref
Minority -11,73% -11,46% -9,60% -10,97% -10,63% -9,45%
Region of Residence
North ref ref ref ref ref ref
Northeast -15,99% -15,83% -12,72% -12,93% -15,54% -13,56%
Southeast 10,98% 6,40% 9,45% 1,35%* 2,95% -1,44%*
South 8,44% 3,02% 166,51% 0,38%* 2,91% -10,84%*
Central West 0,82%* -7,14% 81,75% -50,02% 1,53%* -7,40%
Federal District 41,65% 10,93% 46,12% 43,61% 34,92% 32,33%
Position within the family
Head ref ref ref ref ref ref
Not Head -18,61% -7,01% -9,93% -4,65% -8,28% -2,97%
Family Structure
No Kids ref ref ref ref ref ref
Kids with 14 y/o or less 2,00%* 1,22%* -0,58%* -0,29%* 0,05%* -0,55%*
Kids with older than 14 y/o -3,39% -10,50% -4,91% -8,86% -7,02% -8,26%
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o -2,99% -6,72% -4,67% -6,28% -4,07% -7,23%
Other family structure 1,97%* -5,17% -0,67*% -2,22%* -1,04%* -1,30%*
Observations 35.319 27.309 42.780 32.682 42.764 35.381
Adjusted R2 0,508 0,504 0,495 0,508 0,347 0,369
F-test (P > F) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
2003 2008 2013
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When analyzing ethnical group, for example, men have better returns in the most developed 
regions (Southeast and South), including the Federal District. Considering that these regions 
are the ones with the biggest income per capita and that women are historically 
underrepresented on high-income activities, it is possible to infer that part of this effect is 
being capture by these variables. 
However, the variable representing the position within the household shows a penalty that 
is bigger for men. Here, it is possible to bring the role of patriarchy proposed by Hartmann 
(1981) as one explanation behind the differences observed. Since it is expected that men 
occupy the position of the head of the house, men not performing this role can be penalized 
in terms of wages more than women, who are expected to accept a secondary position 
within the household. Therefore, the fact that the penalty for women in this variable is smaller 
than the men’s penalty is not surprising. 
The patriarchal mindset might also be the reason behind the bigger penalty women suffer 
when observing the variable that represents family structure. Women show consistently 
lower returns in comparison to men when kids are living in the house. It is expected that 
women take more responsibility when it comes to childcare which in turn, can generate fewer 
working hours and an increase in the hours spent doing housework thus, generating a bigger 
impact on women’s ability to earn more money once this activity requires a certain amount 
of dedication that might impact one’s productivity. 
Therefore, when analyzing productivity factors alongside the modifying factors 
(socioeconomic and demographic) women are generally facing lower returns in almost all 
the aspects being considered in this study. This, naturally, influences the average wage an 
individual would receive. These estimates are going to be analyzed in the next section. 
5.2) Adjusted Average Wages 
The adjusted average wages can be obtained by simply imputing the gender averages on 
its specific equation. Since the equation accounts for gender-specific returns, these 
estimates provide a more precise way to measure the average wages both genders would 
get. The table below provides these estimates: 
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Table 7 – Log of Adjusted average wage (BRL) 
 
Source: See Table 1 
As it was expected, the average wage men get is consistently superior to the women’s 
averages, following the pattern of the descriptive statistics. However, the differences 
between the adjusted wages are smaller when compared to the descriptive statistics’ 
averages. 
While the raw averages provide gaps of 29%, 26% and 23% for 2003, 2008 and 2013 
respectively, the adjusted gap show differences around 7,5%, 6% and 5% for each 
respective year. The trend, however, is the same: women are closing the gap. 
It is important to reinforce that the difference in the gap scale is because the descriptive 
statistics provide nothing more than an average among the individuals in the sample. The 
numbers provided in this section are according to the gender-specific characteristics and 
take into account the returns that each gender has for each productivity, socioeconomic and 
demographic components proposed in this study.  
Though it is possible to verify that women are closing the gap, the composition of the gap is 
not clear by just analyzing these numbers. Is the existent gap result from differences in 
characteristics or is it result of discriminatory behavior? The next section aims to provide 
evidence to answer these questions. 
5.3) Gap Decomposition 
The decomposition analysis consists on the results that equation (4) – presented on section 
4.4 – provides. As already mentioned, the decomposition method aims to separate the part 
of the gap that is due observable characteristics (all productivity and modifying factors being 
considered in the model) and unobservable characteristics (usually attributed to 
discrimination).  
However, it is necessary to be cautious when interpreting the estimates for unobservable 
characteristics because not only the effects of discrimination are going to be captured, but 
also everything that was left out the equation will contribute to this estimate. Nonetheless, 
Gender 2003 2008 2013
Male 1,23 1,66 2,17
Female 1,14 1,57 2,06
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the effect of bad proxies or identification problems are also going to be accounted on that 
component. But, since the variables being used rely on the theoretical framework and the 
model follows the basic literature on the subject, it is possible to consider that the estimates 
regarding unexplained characteristics majorly accounts for discrimination. 
That said, the results of the decomposition are presented on the table below: 
Table 8 – Log of Adjusted average wage (BRL) and gap decomposition 
 
Source: See Table 1 
It is possible to verify that the gap did not change in absolute terms, but it has changed in 
relative terms if we consider that wages are growing over time, which means, as already 
concluded on last section, that women are closing the gap proportionately. 
When analyzing the decomposition, however, it gets clear that more than 100% of the gap 
is not explained regardless the year being considered. These results are in line with 
Carvalho, Neri & Silva (2006) as well as Barros et al (1995). Since these studies provided 
information regarding previous years, the conclusion is that discrimination against women is 
an old and persisting factor behind the gap that is not being properly addressed. 
For 2003, unexplained factors accounted for 207% of the gap and that proportion remained 
roughly the same for 2008 (208%). The only major difference happened in 2013, where 
discrimination accounted “only” for 186% of the gap. 
Even though a significant number, it is hard to point what elements are the ones explaining 
discrimination. It can vary from a belief that women are not as productive as men to other 
subjective approaches that are hard to define. 
What can be assessed, however, is if there is any belief that women are not as productive 
as men, this belief is proved wrong in the light of the results aforementioned. The fact that 
Gender 2003 2008 2013
Male 1,23 1,66 2,17
Female 1,14 1,57 2,06
Gap 0,09 0,09 0,10
Explained -0,09 -0,10 -0,09
Unexplained 0,18 0,20 0,19
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the explained component is negative shows that the individual productive characteristics are 
partially offsetting the effects of discrimination. 
In order to understand the mechanics, it is necessary to bear in mind how the decomposition 
method is constructed and what it aims. It is possible to summarize that on two basic 
questions: 
- How much women would earn if they had the same productive characteristics as 
men? 
- How much women would earn if they had the same returns as men?  
While the second question is exactly the effect of discrimination, the first one is the effect of 
the observable characteristics. 
In order to find an answer for the first question, the procedure that the decomposition method 
relies on is to replace men’s averages on women’s returns. That would represent a woman 
with the same productive characteristics as men, but earning as a woman. These are the 
results offsetting the discrimination impact. On other words, women that have male’s 
productive averages would be earning less than an average woman.  
Therefore, in a discrimination-free World where wages would be defined exclusively by 
productive characteristics, women would be in a better condition than men. This assessment 
gets easier to verify when analyzing years of education and tenure on the job separately: 
Table 9 – Years of study sorted by gender 
 
Source: See Table 1 
As it is possible to observe, women have consistently more years of study than men. By 
knowing the impact that education has on wages, it is easy to perceive that a woman that 
has men’s education averages will be a woman below the average in terms of education; 
thus, being penalized on their earnings. Adding to this, since women have lower returns to 
education than men, a lower educational level has a huge impact on women’s earnings. 
However, if women had the same returns as men, they would be in better shape since the 
Gender 2003 2008 2013
Male 9,55 10,25 10,73
Female 10,98 11,62 12,03
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additional years of education would work in their favor and would be better praised in terms 
of wages. 
When analyzing tenure on the job, the results are similar to the ones observed on education: 
Table 10 – Tenure on the job sorted by gender (months) 
 
Source: See Table 1 
Except for 2013, women showed a considerable higher tenure on the job when compared 
to men. Once on-the-job experience is one important component on human capital 
accumulation as well as an important variable to determine wages, it gets clear that women 
with men’s tenure on the job averages will also be penalized in most of the period being 
considered. Nonetheless, since women have lower returns to experience than men, a 
scenario where a woman have the same experience as a men would result in double penalty 
(lower average and less returns). 
Therefore, it gets clear that the productive characteristics are not the factors behind the gap. 
In fact, it is exactly the opposite; women’s productive characteristics are avoiding the gap to 
be even bigger since it is offsetting the effects of discrimination. If the gap is closing 
throughout the years, it is possible to say that this is more connected to women’s 
achievements rather than good policies addressing properly the long discriminatory behavior 
verified on the Brazilian labor market. 
  
Gender 2003 2008 2013
Male 75,68 74,36 74,22
Female 79,67 77,54 72,61
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6. Conclusion and Final Remarks 
Questions regarding the size of the wage-gap and its nature alongside its determinants were 
discussed on the paper through a range of empirical models as well as previous researches. 
The existence of the gap was already a fact but its behavior throughout most recent decades 
was still unclear. Nonetheless, the existence of discrimination was acknowledged and, 
despite its existence and comprehensive work to understand it, very little was done in Brazil 
in order to address this issue. 
Nonetheless, this study aimed to add up to the existing literature about the gender wage-
gap in Brazilian society by bringing this discussion to more recent years using the most up-
to-date database available. 
OLS regressions were estimated to capture the differences in returns that both genders had 
in regard to productivity, demographic and socioeconomic factors. These estimations 
provided the adjusted average wage of each gender and, by having these estimates; it was 
possible to make inferences regarding the gender wage-gap. To understand the composition 
of the gap, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method was used to provide better insights 
about the role of discrimination on wages’ composition. 
The conclusion is that nowadays it is still possible to verify a gender pay-gap around 5% to 
7% in the formal labor market. The trend, even though decreasing, is not result of decreasing 
discrimination per se; which - as this study suggests - still accounts for more than twice the 
gap itself. In reality, the proportional reduction of the gap is due to over-qualification of 
women when compared to men. By having more on-the-job experience and more years of 
education – on average – women are being able to close the gap regardless any effort from 
government or society to generate better working conditions. 
Being these the conclusions of this study, it is worth pointing that policy-makers in Brazil 
should start considering gender equality policies as part of their agenda in a more 
comprehensive way. The creation of the Secretariat of Policies for Women in 2003, even 
though an interesting initiative which provided women more legal tools to stand against 
domestic and other abuses, did very little regarding the problems that women still have to 
face in the labor market. Most of the social policies in this period were focused on ethnical 
and socioeconomic inequalities. These were successful on decreasing the inequality levels 
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in Brazil and empowering minorities in a broad way. Therefore, the next steps on policy 
formulation should target more precisely a group of interest and, by considering the long 
and old problem of discrimination in the labor market; it is time to focus some effort on 
women and their struggle for equal pay in a labor market free of discrimination. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Table 11 – Summary Statistics 
 
Source: See Table 1 
 
 
 
  
Variables Male Female Male Female Male Female
851,29 660,61 1.259,65 1.001,80 1.897,76 1.543,66
(1.100,95) (793,48) (1.662,59) (1.244,3) (2.252,49) (1.775,73)
34,85 35,26 35,23 35,50 36,10 36,05
(20,12) (18,65) (11,06) (10,74) (11,40) (10,90)
75,68 79,67 74,36 77,54 74,22 72,61
(84,71) (84,85) (88,92) (89,28) (89,69) (87,07)
4,83 16,67 4,30 14,61 4,71 15,07
(7,28) (12,82) (6,59) (12,04) (7,18) (12,33)
Educational Level, groups
No Education 4,4% 2,5% 3,6% 1,9% 3,7% 2,0%
From 1-4 years 15,8% 10,8% 11,4% 7,3% 8,4% 4,8%
From 5-8 years 26,4% 17,3% 23,0% 14,5% 20,8% 13,6%
From 9-11 years 40,4% 45,3% 46,2% 47,9% 48,2% 47,3%
From 13+ years 13,0% 24,1% 15,8% 28,4% 19,0% 32,2%
Ethnical Group
Majority 52,3% 57,5% 47,2% 53,2% 51,6% 57,5%
Minority 47,7% 42,5% 52,8% 46,8% 48,4% 42,5%
Region of Residence
North 10,5% 9,9% 10,7% 9,8% 12,7% 11,8%
Northeast 23,2% 23,0% 23,8% 23,3% 22,4% 20,7%
Southeast 35,7% 35,5% 36,2% 35,6% 34,7% 35,1%
South 18,5% 19,5% 16,8% 18,8% 18,0% 20,2%
Central West 8,1% 7,8% 8,6% 8,1% 8,8% 8,2%
Federal District 3,9% 4,3% 3,8% 4,3% 3,4% 4,0%
Position within the family
Head 66,7% 23,1% 58,3% 28,4% 55,2% 30,8%
Not Head 33,3% 76,9% 41,7% 71,6% 44,8% 69,2%
Family Structure
No Kids 11,8% 11,6% 13,9% 12,8% 16,5% 15,1%
Kids with 14 y/o or less 33,9% 29,4% 29,6% 27,0% 26,5% 25,5%
Kids with older than 14 y/o 30,1% 36,3% 33,5% 38,2% 33,1% 37,7%
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o 14,2% 13,3% 12,3% 12,4% 11,3% 11,4%
Other family structure 10,0% 9,5% 10,7% 9,6% 12,6% 10,2%
Observations 35.319 27.309 42.780 32.682 42.764 35.381
Age (years)
Tenure on the Job (months)
Hours of Housework (hours/week)
Earnings (BRL)
2003 2008 2013
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Table 12 – Variables’ Description 
 
Source: See Table 1 
 
 
  
Variable Type Description
Wage Continous Hourly wage (BRL)
Age Continous Individual's age (years)
Tenure on the Job Continous Tenure on the job (months)
Hours of Housework Continous Hours spent on housework (hours/week)
Educational Level Dummy Educational level (years of study)
No Education
From 1-4 years
From 5-8 years
From 9-11 years
From 13+ years
Gender Dummy Gender
Male
Female
Ethnical Group Dummy Ethnical Group
Majority
Minority
Region of Residence Dummy Region of Residence
North
Northeast
Southeast
South
Central West
Federal District
Position within the family Dummy Position within the family
Head
Not Head
Family Structure Dummy Family Structure regarding kids*
Couple - No Kids
Kids with 14 y/o or less
Kids with older than 14 y/o
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o
Other family structure
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Table 13 - Returns with modifying factors sorted by gender. 
 
Source: See Table 1                *Not significant at a 5% level 
 
 
Log hourly wage, BRL Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 0,011 0,011 0,042 0,031 0,033 0,026
Age, squared 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,000 0,000
Tenure on the Job 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002
Hours of Housework -0,003 -0,002 -0,005 -0,004 -0,002 -0,004
Educational Level
No Education ref ref ref ref ref ref
From 1-4 years 0,163 0,094 0,074 -0,003 -0,029* -0,110
From 5-8 years 0,386 0,237 0,251 0,105 0,124 -0,002
From 9-11 years 0,726 0,621 0,541 0,409 0,352 0,218
From 13+ years 1,618 1,405 1,359 1,148 1,076 0,923
Ethnical Group
Majority ref ref ref ref ref ref
Minority -0,125 -0,122 -0,101 -0,116 -0,112 -0,099
Region of Residence
North ref ref ref ref ref ref
Northeast -0,174 -0,172 -0,136 -0,138 -0,169 -0,146
Southeast 0,104 0,062 0,090 0,013 0,029 -0,015
South 0,081 0,030 0,980 0,004 0,029 -0,115
Central West 0,008* -0,074 0,597 -0,694 0,015* -0,077
Federal District 0,348 0,104 0,379 0,362 0,300 0,280
Position within the family
Head ref ref ref ref ref ref
Not Head -0,206 -0,073 -0,105 -0,048 -0,086 -0,030
Family Structure
No Kids ref ref ref ref ref ref
Kids with 14 y/o or less 0,019* 0,012* -0,005* -0,003 0,000* -0,006
Kids with older than 14 y/o -0,034 -0,111 -0,050 -0,093 -0,073 -0,086
Kids with more and less than 14 y/o -0,030 -0,070 -0,048 -0,065 -0,042 -0,075
Other family structure 0,019* -0,053 -0,006* -0,022 -0,010* -0,013
Constant 0,188 0,145 0,184 0,393 1,050 1,182
Observations 35.319 27.309 42.780 32.682 42.764 35.381
Adjusted R2 0,508 0,504 0,495 0,508 0,347 0,369
F-test (P > F) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
2003 2008 2013
